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Teaching Economics, Appreciating Spontaneous Order, and Economics as a Public 
Science 
 
Peter Boettke! 
George Mason University 
 
 
James M. Buchanan has argued that the primary role that the economist 
plays in society is a pedagogical one.   The job of the economists is to 
teach students the principles of economics, most notably an understanding 
of spontaneous order and the role of the price system in generating that 
order within the market.  The didactic purpose is simply to teach students 
so they may in fact become informed participants within the democratic 
process of collective choice.  It is in our job as teachers of the basic 
principles of economic science, and not as pure researchers, let alone as 
policy experts who act as saviors, that justifies the public expenditure on 
the discipline.  Economics to Buchanan is a ‘prophylactic against popular 
fallacies’ and not a tool of social control. 
 
 
JEL: A10; B31; D70; P16 
 
Given the principle of freedom, as active freedom of association, the notion of scientific 
control of society is a palpable contradiction. … In a democracy, the notion of control is 
not merely unethical, it is excluded, ipso facto. …When a man or group asks for power to 
do good, my impulse is to … cancel the last three words, leaving simply "I want power"; 
that is easy to believe. 
         - Frank Knight (1951) 
 
 
Introduction 
James Buchanan is fond of telling the story that when he entered the University of 
Chicago PhD program in economics he was of socialist leanings, yet within 6 weeks of 
Frank Knight’s price theory course, he was no longer a socialist.  What was it that Knight 
taught that had such a transformative effect on Buchanan and several (but not all) of his 
                                                
! University Professor of Economics, and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism, George Mason 
University, Fairfax, VA 22032.  This paper was written for the FSSO conference honoring James Buchanan 
for his lifetime contributions to spontaneous order studies.  I have benefited greatly from the comments 
with Chris Coyne, Bill Dennis, Peter Leeson, Shruti Rajagopalan, and Virgil Storr.  The usual caveat 
applies. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661513
 2 
classmates?   This question has inspired, and vexed, Buchanan throughout his career as 
an economics professor. 
 Frank Knight taught economic students the basic principles of the discipline; the 
idea of scarcity, the necessity of choice, the role of relative prices in guiding adjustment 
to changing circumstances, and the importance of competition in the self-organization of 
the market economy.  “Economic principles,” Knight (1951, p. 7) argued,  “are simply the 
more general implications of the single principle of freedom, individual and social, i.e., free 
association, in a certain sphere of activity.”  The freedom of association that Knight is 
referring to,  is that of exchange, which serves as the basis of social order.  As he would 
stress in Intelligence and Democratic Action (1960, p. 1),  the elementary point that requires 
continual emphasis is that an exchange is an exchange is an exchange.  Exchange is 
voluntary,  and it is mutually beneficial.  Unless both parties benefit from the interaction,  it 
would not be an exchange because it would not be voluntarily entered into and agreed to.  It 
is exchange that gives rise to the division of labor,  and it is exchange that guides production 
plans and satisfies consumption demands.  The subject matter of economics is ultimately 
about exchange relationships among freely choosing individuals and the institutions within 
which those exchanges take place.    
 Unfortunately,  the task of communicating that elementary point to students and the 
public is not always easy because of ignorance and vested interest.  As Knight (1951, p. 4) 
says:  
The serious fact is that the bulk of the really important things that 
economics has to teach are things that people would see for themselves if 
they were willing to see. And it is hard to believe in the utility of trying to 
teach what men refuse to learn or even seriously listen to.  
 
But we must, and do, find utility in trying to teach economics, even if it is only in our 
capacity to serve as an antidote to the poison being disseminated by the anti-economists 
that surround us in our schools and universities, in the churches and on the street, and in 
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the courts and in the legislature.   
 Henry Simon’s in his class at University of Chicago, inspired by Knight’s 
teachings, taught a generation of students that “economics is primarily useful, both to the 
student and to the political leader, as a prophylactic against popular fallacies.” (1983, p. 
3)  Within a system of private property rights, freedom of contract, and monetary 
stability, the market economy will work through relative price adjustments and profit and 
loss accounting to guide individuals in their economic decisions to take into account the 
relevant information about relative scarcities and exchange opportunities.   Mutually 
beneficial exchange is wealth creating, and the market economy through relative price 
adjustments is self-correcting. 
 It is from Knight, that Buchanan learned his understanding of the economic 
process; of how the market economy through the incentives and information of property, 
prices, and profit/loss is the prime example of a spontaneous order.  And in those first 6 
weeks at University of Chicago under Knight’s tutelage, Buchanan moved from a 
passionate populist to a zealous advocate of the market order.  As he has put it: “I was 
converted by the power of ideas, by an understanding of the model of the market.  The 
experience shaped my attitude toward the use and purpose of economic instruction; if I 
could be converted so could others.” (1999 [1986], p. 15) 
 It is this aspect of Buchanan’s career --- that of the economic educator in the 
broadest meaning of that term ---  that I what to explore in this paper.  But my focus is 
not so much on his efforts at building research centers to encourage advanced study in the 
field of public economics and public choice at University of Virginia, Virginia Tech, and 
George Mason; nor will I focus on his role as a PhD supervisor to some 40+ students that 
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include significant and innovative scholars in fields such as experimental economics, law 
and economics, public finance, health economics, industrial organization, and, of course, 
public choice, and constitutional political economy; nor will I stress his role in organizing 
professional associations such as the Committee on Non-Market Decision Making, the 
Public Choice Society, and in the establishment of the scientific journals, Public Choice, 
and Constitutional Political Economy.
1
  Instead, my focus is really on Buchanan’s 
emphasis on elementary or basic economics, and the role of the ‘teacher’ in 
communicating those principles to students and the general public, and how those 
principles can inform and improve the democratic process of collective decision-making.
2
  
To put it bluntly, James Buchanan argues that our primary purpose as economic 
educators, and the only justification for the public support of our efforts, is to teach our 
students (and the general public) the basic principles of economics and to cultivate in 
them an appreciation of the spontaneous ordering of economic activity, so that they in 
turn can become informed participants in the democratic process.  
                                                
1
 For an excellent discussion of Buchanan’s institution building efforts to professionalize graduate 
education and research in public choice and constitutional political economy see Steve Medema’s 
discussion in The Hesitant Hand. (2009, pp. 125-159)  Also see Richard Wagner’s (2004) discussion of 
public choice as an academic enterprise and the experience at UVA, VPI and GMU. 
2
 This emphasis on basic principles also explains Buchanan’s close affinity with the Austrian school of  
economics throughout his career.  It is not just the thoroughgoing subjectivism of the Austrians that 
attracted Buchanan’s intellectual interests, though as he argues in Cost and Choice (1999 [1969], p. xiv, the 
problem with modern economists is that they too often “rush headlong into the intricacies of analysis while 
overlooking certain points of elementary economic logic.”  In this instance, Buchanan was stressing the 
consistent and persistent application of opportunity cost reasoning.  In general it is important to remember 
throughout that Buchanan, besides being a subjectivist, is a methodological individualist social scientist, an 
exchange theorist in market and politics, an institutional theorist in law, politics and society, a spontaneous 
order theorist of the market, a positive political economist in public finance, and a social contract theorist in 
political science.  But in all these endeavors, Buchanan demands that we come back to the elementary 
economic logic and pursue it consistently and persistently throughout the analysis.  One of the empirical 
curiosities of the modern profession of economics, Buchanan notes, is that the Austrian economists seem to 
have a comparative advantage in communicating this elementary economic logic to students.  See 
Buchanan’s generally positive reaction to the revival of interest in Austrian economics that began in the 
1970s. (Buchanan 1999 [1979], pp. 47-48) 
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What Should Economists Do? 
The economist looking out into the world of a commercial society is immediately struck 
with two primordial facts: individuals pursue their self-interest, and modern commercial 
society with its vast division of labor is orderly.  It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the baker and the brewer that we get our dinner.  Despite the disparate purposes 
being pursued by economic actors in the market, ‘Paris gets fed’.  In short, the first task 
of the economist is to explain how these two facts of commercial life --- self-interest, and 
social order --- are consistent with one another.  If one cannot explain the consistency, 
then one has failed in the first task of being an economist. 
 It is important to stress that this does not commit the economist to the Panglosean 
fallacy.  There can be much that is wrong in society that could benefit from collective 
action, and I will talk about that in the next section.  But understanding the “invisible 
hand” proposition of economics is the first task that must be accomplished otherwise all 
other questions cannot be addressed adequately. 
 Not only must the “invisible hand” or “spontaneous order” proposition be 
understood, but it has to be understood in a dynamic, rather than static, sense if it is going 
to be helpful.  We must not try to understand the overall order in the economy as if it was 
chosen by a benevolent social planner who is choosing the optimal allocation of 
resources for society.  Instead, the order we are trying to understand is the composite 
outcome of the striving of a multitude of individuals each striving to realize their plans, 
often in conflict with one another, and reconciled through the exchange process.  
 6 
 The central message of Buchanan’s classic paper “What Should Economists Do?” 
(1999 [1962], p. 29) is that theory of exchange and not the theory of resource allocation 
should take center stage in economics.
3
  Economists, Buchanan argues, have to face up to 
their basic disciplinary responsibility and understand their subject matter.  That subject 
matter is “Man’s behavior in the market relationship, reflecting the propensity to truck 
and to barter, and the manifold variations in structure that this relationship can take.”  It is 
this particular form of human activity and the institutional arrangements that arise 
because of this activity that is the proper subject of the economist’s study.  The dominant 
allocation problem approach, on the other hand, misleads economists into viewing the 
economic problem in society as one of applied mathematics that can be addressed by 
social engineers entrusted with the policy levers of control.  
 But the economic problem of society is decidedly not one of allocating scarce 
means to obtain a defined end.
4
  When elementary economics is taught in this optimal 
allocation manner, the message is easily communicated to students that someone or some 
group must be in charge at the levers of social control and manage the economic system.  
                                                
3
 See the symposium in the Review of Austrian Economics for a contemporary treatment of this point, 
Wagner (2007). 
4
 See, e.g., Hayek (1948 [1944], p. 77-78; 80; 82; 91).  “The economic problem of society is thus not 
merely a problem of how to allocate ‘given’ resources – if ‘given’ is taken to mean given to a single mind 
which deliberately solves the problem set by these ‘data’.  It is rather a problem of how to secure the best 
use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these 
individuals know.  Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to 
anyone in its totality.”  Hayek, later stresses not only that the knowledge he is talking about is not abstract 
and technical knowledge, but “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” that is 
revealed only within the context of the market process.  Furthermore, he is quick to stress this knowledge is 
constantly changing to reflect the changing circumstances of economic life.  The economic problem that 
society faces is not one that lends itself to representation in the optimal solution to a system of 
simultaneous equations.  “It is, perhaps, worth stressing,” Hayek states, “that economic problems arise 
always and only in consequence of change.”  The price system works its marvels in the context of 
responding to, reflecting and ultimately guiding day-to-day adjustments.  Hayek does not deny a useful role 
for equilibrium analysis in economics, but he does suggest that something is fundamentally wrong with an 
approach that “habitually disregards an essential part of the phenomena with which we have to deal: the 
unavoidable imperfections of man’s knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which knowledge 
is constantly communicated and acquired.” 
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Students are often taught that all economic system must answer the questions of how, 
what, and for whom --- how are goods going to be produced; what goods are going to be 
produced; and for whom are the goods going to be produced.  Students are then taught 
that the market system through the incentives of clearly defined and strictly enforced 
property rights, and the guiding force of prices and profit and loss accounting statements 
answer these questions so effectively that exchange efficiency and production efficiency 
are simultaneously achieved.  All the gains from exchange will be realized, prices will 
reflect the full opportunity cost of production, and the least cost technologies will be 
employed in production.  No possible arrangement of economic affairs could improve the 
situation. Unless, of course, there are imperfections in the market mechanism caused by 
monopoly, imperfect information, and/or externalities, which will prevent the market 
from achieving an efficient allocation of resources.  Gains from trade will go unexploited; 
price will not reflect opportunity costs; and production will not employ the least cost 
technologies.  Opportunities for social improvement abound, but cannot be realized 
within the market due to the imperfections; the needed reform must come from outside 
the system.  When confronted with such imperfections, the typical student is then taught 
that the economic role of government is to address through public policy the problems of 
market structure and the conflicts over resource use.  Government provides the corrective 
to the imperfections of the market economy.  The structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm in anti-trust economics is one such example of government as corrective, 
Pigovian welfare economics is another, and consumer protection is yet another still.  The 
market economy, students are taught in most economics classes, is great when it works, 
but its ability to work is limited to situation where a set of highly restrictive assumptions 
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hold.  Where there are deviations from the ideal pattern in allocation, the government acts 
proactively to align prices with costs, and align private and social costs in decisions. 
 A lot in this elementary tale of the economic system is important information for 
students to learn.  For the spontaneous and complex coordination of market activity to be 
achieved the induced variables of the market (prices and profit/loss) and the underlying 
variables of the market (tastes, technology, and resource availability) must exhibit a 
strong tendency to dovetail, otherwise the “order” of the market would not be that 
orderly.  In other words, the relationship between prices and costs, and private and social 
costs are important to understand in talking about private and public choices.  Social 
cooperation under the division of labor emerges as individuals within an economic 
system strive to realize the gains from trade and the gains from innovation guided by the 
ordinary motivations of men, and the informational signals provided by relative prices 
and profit and loss accounting.  In the limit, when all those gains are in fact realized, 
resources would indeed at that precise moment be allocated to highest valued users and 
all least cost technologies would be employed.  But “efficiency” is not the goal or 
purpose of the market.  The market economy itself does not possess a teleology, though 
the individuals participating in the market have their own purposes and plans they are 
striving to achieve.
5
 
 As Buchanan stresses: “The ‘market’ or market organization is not a means 
toward the accomplishment of anything.  It is, instead, the institutional embodiment of 
the voluntary exchange processes that are entered into by individuals in their several 
                                                
5
 For a more recent elaboration on the non-teleological nature of the market economy see Buchanan and 
Vanberg (2001 [1991]).   It is critical to remember the phraseology highlighted by Hayek (1967) to capture 
spontaneous order --- “of human action, but not of human design.”   The order itself has no purpose, but the 
participants in the order have multiple purposes that they are pursuing.  This is one of the key 
characteristics of spontaneous orders in the social world, as opposed to the physical world.  
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capacities.  This is all that there is to it.  Individuals are observed to cooperate with one 
another, to reach agreements, to trade.  The network of relationships that emerge or 
evolves out of this trading process, the institutional framework, is called ‘the market’.” 
(Buchanan 1999 [1962], 38)  The “order” of the market is defined within the process of 
its emergence.  There is no order capable of being defined independent of the process 
itself.  Neither allocation nor distribution are outcomes of an economic system that can be 
defined outside of the context of the trading behavior and exchange relationships that 
produce it. (see Buchanan 1999 [1982]) 
 The constellation of relative prices that actors within the economy face in making 
decisions provide them with both an incentive and a signal that is essential in their 
assessment of the situation as they choose this path or that.  The existing array of prices, 
in other terms, provide the ex ante information about relative scarcities that economic 
actors use to infer alternative use of resources and methods of production.  The market 
price that is paid for the good or service, and the profit and loss statement revealed in the 
market from offering those goods and services, provide economic actors with an ex post 
assessment of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the enterprising decisions 
made.  And, the very discrepancy between the ex ante expectations, and the ex post 
realization in the market, motivates the discovery or learning by economic actors of 
better ways to match their production plans with consumption demands. If this process of 
production and exchange doesn’t take place, the knowledge and incentives required to 
produce the complex coordination of the market would not exist.  It is not just that the 
information would be difficult to surmise; it is literally that it would not exist.  
 10 
 The fundamental point that Buchanan’s emphasizes on the emergent nature of the 
“order” of the market, is that absent the market process there is no economic order to 
define.  It is the buying and abstaining from buying; the haggling; the bargaining; the 
trucking, the bartering, and the exchanging the produces the market “order”.   In short, 
we must always come back to stress as economists that the subject matter of economics is 
exchange and the institutions within which exchange takes place. 
 The juxtaposition of the exchange approach to economics with the approach to 
economics that emphasizes optimal societal allocation and just distribution as products of 
a benevolent social planner sets the stage for Buchanan’s distinction between economics 
and politics, as well as the emphasis on rules and the institutional framework.  Questions 
of “just distribution” are never about particular distributions of resources, but instead 
always about the choices over the rules of the game which engender a pattern of 
exchange, production, and thus distribution.  Fairness is about rules, not outcomes; justice 
is about process, not end-states.   
 Similarly, the market economy is not competitive by assumption, but becomes 
competitive.  “It is this becoming process, brought about by the continuous pressure of 
human behavior in exchange, that is the central part of our discipline, not the dry-rot of 
postulated perfection.  A solution to a general-equilibrium set of equations is not 
predetermined by exogenously-determined rules.  A general solution, if there is one, 
emerges as a result of a whole network of evolving exchanges, bargains, trades, side 
payments, agreements, contracts which, finally at some point, ceases to renew itself.  At 
each stage in this evolution towards solution, there are gains to be made, there are 
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exchanges possible, and this being true the direction of movement is modified.” 
(Buchanan 1999 [1962], p. 37) 
 Economics as a science of exchange cannot yield precise predictions about exact 
points, but instead yields pattern predictions about tendencies and direction of change.   
The market is a spontaneous order, and the consistency of that order originates within the 
process itself, and thus any attempt to construct the order independent of that process is 
meaningless.  We as economists have no way of knowing what the market will choose in 
advance of the process, it will choose, as Buchanan has put it, what it will choose. (see 
Buchanan 1999 [1954], p. 101)   Economics is about the social relations of freely-
contracting actors, politics, on the other hand, is about social relationships where 
individuals deal with one another in a coercive or potentially coercive manner.  
Buchanan’s unique take on politics, however, is to stress the potential for changes in the 
rules of governance within the coercive or quasi-coercive institutions that can provide the 
basis for improvement in the economic-political game.  The task of the economist is to 
study the exchange relationship that evolve within the market process, the task of the 
political economist is to propose changes in the rules that will yield greater gains from 
trade and gains from innovation within the on-going market process so institutionally 
defined.  It is in this sense, that Buchanan squares the entrepreneurial theory of the 
market with its emphasis on the continual evolution of the exchange process, with the 
contractarian theory of the state with its emphasis on the pre-constitutional level of 
choice among rules and the post-constitutional level of political activity within the given 
set of rules. 
 
 12 
What Role for the Economist and Political Economist in Society? 
The exchange paradigm that Buchanan advocates challenges the pretensions of social 
engineers.  Economists must never pro-offer advice to politicians as if they were offering 
advice to a benevolent social planner, and they also must never assume the role of 
benevolent social planners themselves.  The wisdom of classical political economy was 
to resist such delusions of grandeur. 6  As Adam Smith (1976 [1776], Bk IV, Ch. 2, p. 
478) warned, politicians who attempt to control the economy would not only be operating 
without the knowledge of the local situation that businessmen and entrepreneurs possess, 
but would necessarily load themselves with a level of power over others in society that 
could not be safely trusted to no individual lawgiver or council or senate of lawgivers, 
and would nowhere be as dangerous as in the hands of those who “had folly and 
presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.”  Smith’s (1982 [1759], p. 233) 
“man of systems”, who is “wise in his own conceit” is the object of scorn in the 
Buchanan framework as it obviously was for Smith. 
 Politics cannot be viewed as a process of achieving “truth judgment” unless we 
want to risk tyranny at the hands of the conceited ‘elite’ who believe they are in 
possession of truth.7  Much of 20th century economics and public policy developed to fit 
this progressive elite intellectual agenda.  Consolidation of governmental units and 
centralization of bureaucratic entities combined with rule by trained experts defines the 
                                                
6
 My colleague David Levy argues that “saving ideas” was a significant motivation for the institution 
building effort of James Buchanan and G. Warren Nutter at the University of Virginia and the Thomas 
Jefferson Center for Political Economy.  Buchanan and Nutter had vowed to each other during their student 
days that if they ever had the opportunity to work together in the same department, they would in fact work 
to “save the ideas” of classical political economy.  The UVa effort must be, judged on all conventional 
measures, a fantastic success. See Buchanan (2001 [1983]). 
7
 See Buchanan’s discussion of the debate between Knight and M. Polanyi (1999 [1967]) and his further 
elaboration on the potential for tyranny in politics as science (2001 [1986a]). 
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professionalization of modern governance and public administration. (see V. Ostrom 
1973)8  The role the economist plays in the progressive intellectual agenda must be that of 
a technical expert who is entrusted with the tools of social control.  The “good society” 
results from exercising those tools of social control optimally.  The economist qua social 
engineer follows naturally from the progressive intellectual and public policy agenda.  
And the way mainstream economics developed after the Great Depression, and the post-
WWII consensus on the neo-Keynesian synthesis, feed directly into this progressive 
agenda often quite unconsciously, but at other times explicitly so.  The “invisible hand” 
of the market was said to have been demonstrated to have been a “palsied hand”, and thus 
in need of the “visible hand” of the state to accomplish the task of steering the economy. 
 Economic regulators were to use the tools of the state to correct for 
microeconomic inefficiencies and fiscal and monetary policies were going to be used to 
correct for macroeconomic instability.  The perspective communicated in either Abba 
Lerner’s The Economics of Control (1946) or Paul Samuelson’s classic text, Economics 
(1948), saw the role of the economist as that of potential savior equipped with the 
appropriate scientific/engineering tools to right social ills and guide the ship of state.  But, 
of course, such a perceived role of the economists makes sense, only if the state is 
perceived as an active agent in the economy, and the discipline of economics is more akin 
to engineering than philosophy.  Such a view of the economist as societal savior is to be 
subject to ridicule in a world where the government is seen as limited in scale and scope, 
                                                
8
 Aligica and Boettke (2009, pp. 5-51) provide an overview of the metropolitan reform debate in public 
administration and political economy. 
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just as the view of the economist as a philosopher and student of society makes 
himself/herself irrelevant in world where the state is expected to play an active role in the 
economic game.   The following matrix may illustrate the situation:9 
 
 State as Referee State as Player 
Economist as Student Classical Liberalism <unstable> 
Economist as Savior <unstable> Activist Government 
 
 Buchanan’s perspective is described by the upper left cell, and in that cell the 
economist is not granted any privileged position in society. The economist is in the much 
more humble position of being a student of society, a teacher of the knowledge gleaned 
from his/her study, and at times a social critic of existing practice in his citizen capacity.  
What he/she is never permitted to do is claim to have a direct line to god-like truth, never 
mind god-like powers, which justify imposing his/her vision on fellow citizens.  Instead, 
as mentioned earlier, the primary role of the economist is to teach students the basic 
principles of economics so that they may become informed participants in the democratic 
process.  Now remember that “teacher” in this context is being more broadly defined to 
include a variety of activities that go far beyond the classroom proper; including the 
presentation of refined research to one’s scientific peers, the presentation of policy 
analysis to decision makers, public commentary on current affairs in newspapers, and 
                                                
9
 See Boettke and Horwitz (2005), Boettke and Coyne (2006), and Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2006) for a 
further elaboration on these ideas about the role of the economists in society. 
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classroom instruction at a variety of levels from principles classes to advanced seminars 
for PhD students.  In short, we are always engaged in “studying” and “teaching”, but not 
“preaching” let alone “imposing”. 
 The reformist thrust of economics is beyond the reach of the economist proper, 
though the political economist does have an important role in reform efforts even in the 
Buchanan framework of the humbled worldly philosopher.10  Again, that role is far 
different from the one conceived of for the economist as savior.  The political economist, 
Buchanan stressed, works at the level of rules, not at the level of active play within the 
rules.  The subtle position Buchanan develops is laid out in his classic paper “Positive 
Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy.” (1999 [1959])   
 The intellectual dilemma that faces economics as a discipline, Buchanan argues, is 
that in the interest of the scientific stature of the discipline the pure economist must 
maintain strict value-freedom, limit their analysis to means-ends assessment, and the 
deriving of testable hypotheses.  The professional economist has a very small in the 
policy formation process.  But, due to the nature of the discipline and its central 
importance in political debate, the professional will continue to attract young minds to its 
ranks who desire to assist the policy formation process, and to do so with the aid of the 
scientific discipline of economics. 
 The Buchanan restatement of political economy is an attempt to provide the 
solution to this intellectual agenda.  To capture the imagination of the young and 
                                                
10
 Humility is not to counsel despair.  Buchanan’s teacher Frank Knight would say that to call a situation 
hopeless, is to call it ideal.  Since the world is far from ideal, the situation must not be hopeless.  Humility 
and political economy reform need not conflict with one another, but we always must be on-guard for 
hubristic ambitions sneaking in if we want to avoid reform efforts being derailed by constructivism. 
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ambitious social reformer, but to steer them toward an analysis of policies that do not 
violate the value-freedom strictures of positive economics.  The critical step in this 
endeavor is the rejection of the omniscience assumption that is implicitly accepted in both 
old and new welfare economics.11  The observing economist is not in a privileged position 
to judge the system from above against some idealized standard of ‘efficiency’.   Once the 
privileged position is rejected, the efficiency concept that the economist can discuss is 
one of voluntary agreement among the participants in the process.  Nothing more, nothing 
less.  To go back to Knight again, an exchange is an exchange is an exchange.  So what then 
can the economist say? 
 As Buchanan puts it: “The political economist is often conceived as being able to 
recommend policy A over policy B.  If, as we have argued above, no objective social 
criterion exists, the economists qua scientist is unable to recommend.  Therefore, any 
policy discussion on his part appears to take on normative implications.  But there does 
exist a positive role for the economist in the formation of policy.  His task is that of 
diagnosing social institutions and presenting to the choosing individuals a set of possible 
changes.  He does not recommend policy A over policy B.  He presents policy A as a 
                                                
11
 In a brilliant passage that anticipated much of the subsequent development of the economic and political 
economy analysis of socialism and the social democratic welfare states, Ludwig von Mises (1966 [1949], p. 
692) argues that the inference that the state should be in control of the economy follows inescapably once 
intellectual perfection as well as moral perfection is attributed to government officials.  Once we assume 
not only best of intentions, but omniscience, then it is obvious that the infallible state will do better than 
erring individuals in the conduct of business and ordinary life.  One way to understand the relationship 
between Austrian economics as developed by Mises-Hayek-Kirzner was to challenge the assumption of 
omniscience in economic analysis while for value-freedom purposes leaving the assumption of 
benevolence in place.  While much of the subsequent development of public choice theory in the 1950s and 
1960s did the opposite, left the neoclassical assumption of omniscience in place but challenged the 
benevolence assumption.  As we see here in Buchanan’s classic paper on the role of the political economist, 
he is challenging both assumptions and this is the analytical path that those working on developing robust 
political economy are following as well. See Boettke and Leeson (2004), and Boettke and Coyne (2009). 
 17 
hypothesis subject to testing.  The hypothesis is that policy A will, in fact, prove to be 
Parteo-optimal.  The conceptual test is consensus among members of the choosing group, 
not objective improvement in some measurable social aggregate.” (1999 [1959], p. 195) 
 The policy task of the economist is to offer possible changes in the rules of the 
economic game that are acceptable to all parties and will produce Parteo improvement.  
Political economy, therefore, deals with a particular form of social change, that of 
collective action.  The deliberation among members of a social group over the rules that 
govern their interactions with one another in their attempt to live better together.  The 
spontaneous adjustments that arise within production and exchange activity due to shifts 
in tastes, technology or resource availability are not the subject of collective action 
deliberation.  These changes in the market guided by relative prices and profit and loss 
accounting occur constantly against the backdrop of an existing set of property rights 
rules and their enforcement.  The economist qua economist is a student of this dynamic 
process of accommodating changes guided by relative prices and disciplined with feedback 
from profit and loss statements; a student of the spontaneous order of the market.  The 
economist qua economist as a social critic can point out possible problems with the 
existing structure of property rights and/or government policies and how due to incentive 
incompatibilities and/or distortions in the informational processing and feedback the 
existing rights and policy regime may in fact be preventing gains from trade to be realized 
or gains from innovation to be pursued.  And the political economists qua political 
economist on the basis of the scientific knowledge of spontaneous order and the analysis 
of means-ends that the discipline of economics provides can offer hypothetical changes to 
 18 
the rule structure that would yield Pareto improvements subject to the constraint of 
consensus among members of the collective action unit. 
 As we stressed earlier, the role of the economist is not as a savior to society; 
he/she is not a technical expert to be relied upon to fix ills through social engineering.  No, 
the role of the economist is the far humbler one; that of a student of society and teacher of 
the basic principles of the discipline.  His/her primary task is to communicate to students 
and the general public a basic appreciation of the spontaneous order of the market and the 
core ideas of choice against constraints and mutually beneficial exchange.  The knowledge 
of the discipline of economics is essential to helping his/her ‘students’ becoming informed 
participants in the democratic process of collective choice. 
 
Why Constitutional Craftsmanship Is Consistent with Spontaneous Order? 
Alexander Hamilton (1787) argued in The Federalist #1 that the critical question that 
confronted his generation in America was whether good government can be a 
consequence of reflection and choice, or will it forever remain a consequence of accident 
and force. This political question of Hamilton’s remains an essential one to answer.  In 
modern times, the exploration of the US constitutional experience became the research 
agenda of political economists such as F. A. Hayek (1960) and James M. Buchanan (see 
Buchanan and Tullock 1962).  In their hands, it is an effort in developing a theory of 
“robust political economy” and it is synonymous with the development of the field of 
constitutional political economy (see Boettke and Leeson 2004).  To put it simply, can we 
take men as given with their ordinary motivations and their limited knowledge and find a 
set of rules that effectively ties the hands of the rulers in a way that allows them to 
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govern, but not abuse the power so entrusted, creating the conditions under which 
members of society can freely engage in the complex coordination of economic activities 
to realizes the gains from trade and innovation?
12
 
 As points of emphasis in their respective works, Hayek concentrated on the limits 
on man’s knowledge at the abstract level, and the contextual nature of the knowledge 
residing in the economy at the concrete level, while Buchanan stressed the 
institutional/organizational logic of politics and the systemic incentives that different rule 
environments generate.  In both, however, the central message of same players, different 
rules, produce different games is seen throughout their work in comparative political 
economy.  To Hayek the puzzle was how to limit the rationalistic hubris of men, to 
Buchanan the puzzle was how to limit the opportunistic impulse of men.  Both found 
hope in what they called a “generality norm” embedded in a constitutional contract --- no 
law shall be passed, or rule established, which privileges one group of individuals in 
society.
13
   Hayek (1960) seemingly relies on an evolutionary process of trial and error in 
rule regimes that selects for those rules that enable group success and weeds out those 
that derail group progress, while Buchanan proposes a constitutional ‘convention’ that 
                                                
12
 See Hayek (1948 [1946], p. 11-14) where he argues that “the main point about which there can be little 
doubt is that Smith’s chief concern was not so much with what men might occasionally achieve when he 
was at his best but that he should have as little opportunity as possible to do harm when he was at his 
worst.” The Scottish Enlightenment philosophers searched for a “social system which does not depend for 
its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they are now, 
but which makes use of men in all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, 
sometimes intelligent and more often stupid.  Their aim was a system under which it should be possible to 
grant freedom to all, instead of restricting it, as their French contemporaries wished to, to ‘the good and the 
wise.’”  The great intellectual discovery of these 18
th
 century political economists and social philosophers 
was that “the system of private property did provide such inducements [to direct the ordinary motivations 
of men to pursue their self-interest by contributing to the betterment of others] to a much greater extent 
than had yet been understood.”  Man with his ordinary motivation of self-interest and with his limited 
cognitive capacities is nevertheless directed toward pursuing actions which result in the the common good 
through the institutional setting of private property and freedom of competition in the marketplace. 
13
 See the fascinating interview between Hayek and Buchanan from 1978, now available online in video at: 
http://www.hayek.ufm.edu/index.php/James_Buchanan. 
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employs a ‘veil of ignorance’ construct to ensure fairness in the social contract and 
strives for a social contract that exhibits conceptual unanimity.  In actual practice, we do 
not see either evolution or social contract in pure form, but instead, some combination 
where constitutional contracts are based on evolved social norms if they are to “stick” in 
any given society (see Boettke, Coyne and Leeson 2008).  What we see is an interaction 
between creative constitutional craftsmanship and codification of existing norms into 
formal law.  The subordinate state of constitutionalism finds its legitimacy in the 
inhibited state of cultural norms and methods of social sanction; if the formal rules of 
governance are not grounded in the informal rules embedded in norms and social 
conventions, then the cost of enforcement would be prohibitive.
14
 
 The normative thrust of classical political economy is to craft rules that both bind 
government power and establish an environment that promotes social cooperation under 
the division of labor.  In thinking about the constitutional contract, it is useful to use 
Buchanan’s (2000 [1975]) distinctions between the protective state (law and order), the 
productive state (public goods), and the redistributive state (rent-seeking), and to see the 
basic conundrum as to whether or not we can find a set of rules of governance that 
enables the protective and the productive state without unleashing the redistributive state.   
 Rules must bind the behavior of politicians even though they don’t transform 
human nature.  In other words, men remain presumed to be knaves
15
, but the rules of 
good governance within which men interact with one another discipline their knavery to 
                                                
14
 See Boettke (2001 [1994]) on the infrastructure of economic development and also the work of Claudia 
Williamson (2009) on informal and formal institutions. 
15
 David Hume (1985 [1758], p. 42) counseled that when political economists design rules of governance, 
and propose constitutional constraints and checks and balances they should do so under the working 
assumption that all men are knaves.  This way the rules would work in such a manner that bad men can do 
least harm.  Also see Brennan and Buchanan (2000 [1985], pp. 53-75). 
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such an extent that knavish behavior is held in check to the point of non-existence.  Rules 
of good governance can also limit the rationalistic hubris of politicians that is evident in 
their efforts to exercise command and control over the economy. 
 The important point to stress for our present purposes is that there is no conflict 
between the exercise of constitutional craftsmanship and the appreciation of the 
spontaneous order within a market economy with clearly defined and enforced property 
rights and freedom on contract, and the recognition of the socio-evolutionary processes 
that occur in any society to produce norms and mores that enable individuals in groups to 
cooperate with one another even sometimes in very difficult circumstances.  
Constitutional craftsmanship, properly understood, cannot step outside of history and 
propose imaginary scenarios of completely new rules.  Buchanan’s strictures against 
omniscience in political economy cut against the constructivist impulse, just as his work 
on the relevance of the status quo in political economy gives us the guideline for where 
the exercise in constitutional craftsmanship must begin. 
 The status quo in Buchanan’s framework possesses no normative weight, but it 
does possess analytical weight.  It is what it is.  We begin from the here and now, and not 
some imaginary start state where the problems that plague the existing structure of rights 
could be safely assumed away.  The task of the political economist in constitutional 
craftsmanship remains that of proposing hypothetical rule changes that must generate 
agreement among the members of the collective action unit, including those who 
currently benefit from the status quo.  Politics as exchange seeks to find the Pareto 
improving deals that can produce agreement, and the compensation principle is a 
significant guide in that process of collective choice. 
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 That constitutional craftsmanship begins with the here and now means it is 
constrained by history, but it doesn’t mean it is a slave to history.  The relationship 
between culture and political economy is a nuanced one; culture is neither perfectly rigid 
nor perfectly malleable.  But culture is omnipresent and cannot be escaped.  To use Eric 
Jones’s phrase, we see Cultures Merging (2006) throughout history with respect to 
institutional change and economic growth.
16
  
 When Hayek (1960) included his appendix “Why I am Not a Conservative?” the 
message he was trying to communicate was that like Hamilton he was unwilling to 
acquiesce to accident and force, when proper reflection and choice could be employed to 
improve the human condition.  The Constitution of Liberty, as part of a larger project in 
Hayek’s mind concerning “The Abuse of Reason” (see Caldwell 2004, pp. 232-260), did 
attempt to disabuse intellectuals of their hubris.  Hayek sought to ‘use reason to whittle 
down the claims of Reason’ as he put it.  But, again, the point of the book was to 
persuade others that a change in rules – both general rules over the nature of government, 
and particular rules, such as monetary policy or labor policy, were needed if western 
civilization was going to continue to advance along a trajectory of peace and prosperity.  
Hayek’s main insight, and a point which Buchanan would develop even further, was that 
the particular rules of policy must be consistent with the general rules of governance if 
we are to make progress.  Government was to be bound by rules, not run by interests. 
 But in coming to this critical assessment, Hayek conceded an important 
epistemological point in the effort to get sound social change of the rules of good 
governance.  While the social scientist should be critical of all social conventions and 
                                                
16
 See Boettke (2009b) review of Jones’s book. 
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existing patterns of social rules, he/she cannot be critical of all of them at the same time.  
To take the critical rationalist stance, Hayek argued, one must hold as given the 
background a host of existing behaviors and criticize not root and branch all of social 
rules.  The rational constructivist proposes root and branch social transformation, Hayek 
argues that such an effort is hubristic and doomed to frustration and failure.  On the other 
hand, Hayek -- despite how some (including Buchanan at various times) have interpreted 
him to be saying – does not counsel that constitutional craftsmanship is doomed to such 
frustration and failure.  Far from it, otherwise how could he have written such works as 
The Constitution of Liberty, let alone the 3
rd
 volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty. (see 
Hayek 1979)  Freedom to Hayek, as it is to Buchanan, is to be found in the constitutional 
contract that binds the hands of the rulers, and yet establishes the institutional framework 
that enables us to live better together; it is the institutional framework provided by the 
constitution that turns situations of social conflict, into opportunities for social 
cooperation. 
 Buchanan (2000 [1993]) confronted this Hayekian epistemic problem in social 
change in his reflections on post-socialist political economy.  The ‘tacit presuppositions 
of political economy’, Buchanan argued had to be explicitly recognized and examined in 
light of the radically different historical experience of the people under socialist regimes.  
History matters in doing institutional analysis; as Buchanan puts it: “History, and the 
historical imagination that it shapes, matters.” (2000 [1993], p. 422)  It is the lived history 
of a people that forms the status quo from which social change through constitutional 
craftsmanship must be accomplished. 
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 Root and branch constitutional construction is to be rejected as suffering from the 
“fatal conceit”, but constitutional craftsmanship from within an existing status quo, and 
negotiated within an ongoing process of collective action is an intricate part of 
establishing a liberal order.
17
  And it is through this ongoing process that an appreciation 
of spontaneous order not only doesn’t conflict with constitutional craftsmanship, but 
gives economic content to the rule structure toward which our  efforts at craftsmanship 
must strive if it is the desire of the citizenry to live better more meaningful and self-
directed lives.
18
  There may indeed be many ways for individuals to live, but there are 
actually few ways for them to live together and simultaneously achieve individual 
autonomy, peaceful social relations, and generalized prosperity.
19
  
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that James Buchanan puts great emphasis on the economist’s role as 
student of society and teacher of basic principles of economics.  The task of the 
economist and political economist is never conceived as that of the social engineer in 
command of the levers of social control in the polity and over the economy.  As our 
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 As Buchanan states: “Hayek’s strictures against the rational constructivists are directed at those putative 
scholar-reformers who would ignore the boundaries established by these culturally evolved abstract rules 
for behaviour , who would, quite literally, seek to make ‘new men,’ who would overturn the eighteenth-
century discovery of the essential uniformities of human nature upon which any understanding of, and 
hence prospect for reform of, social interaction must rest.” (Buchanan 2001 [1986b], p. 317) 
18
 Boettke (2009a) argues that not only must the rules be binding, they must signal specific content if they 
are going to produce social change in the direction of peace and prosperity. 
19
 Dani Rodrik (2007) may want to insist that there is ‘one economics with many recipes’, but if recorded 
human history is the guide there is actually ‘one economics and few recipes for peace and prosperity’.  
Private property, freedom of trade, freedom of contract, monetary stability and fiscal responsibility is the 
basic recipe.  Of course, this recipe has to be adopted and modified according to local conditions rather 
than being imposed from afar by Washington technocrats, and in that sense Rodrik’s central point is not off 
mark.  The only path to reform is an indigenous one, but not all indigenous paths are productive ones to 
pursue.  The development debate, like all modern economic policy debates, was adversely impacted by the 
“Keynesian divergence” and continues to suffer from this intellectual legacy of aggregate analysis and 
policies of social control. 
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epigraph from Knight argued, such a conception of the role of the economists is at odds 
with the very notion of democratic governance and within a democratic system actually is 
unethical.  Who actually agreed to privilege the economist in the political discourse? 
 Instead, the economist and political economist has the far humbler, yet essential 
role to play in a free society.  As economists we teach students (broadly defined) the 
basic principles of our scientific discipline so that they may in fact become informed 
participants within the democratic process.  As Buchanan (2001 [1977], p. 96) explicitly 
states: 
I have often argued that there is only one principle in economics that is 
worth stressing, and that the economists’ didactic function is one of 
conveying some understanding of this principle to the public at large.  
Apart from this principle there would be no basis for general public 
support for economics as a legitimate academic discipline, no place for 
economics as an appropriate part of a liberal educational curriculum.  I 
refer, of course, to the principle of the spontaneous order of the market, 
which was the great intellectual discovery of the eighteenth century. 
 
The political economist, on the other hand, as we have argued, proposes hypothetical 
changes in the structure of rules that are subjected to the test of consensus of others 
within the collective choice arena.  Order is not imposed, order results from agreement. 
 The order of the market is spontaneous, and emerges from the exchange behavior 
of individuals within a pre-existing structure of property rights and rules of engagement 
and mechanisms of enforcement.  It is an on-going process within rules.  At a different 
level of analysis, there is the choice over the rules that frame this process and help that 
order continually define and redefine itself is a consequence of conscious deliberation.  
Buchanan’s great contribution to political economy and social philosophy, was to 
reconcile the emphasis on economic processes and the strategic behavior of individuals 
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within the economic game, and the choice over the rules of the game, the enforcement of 
those rules and in general the constitutional level of analysis.  In so doing, Buchanan 
demonstrates how only through the utilization of a value-neutral science of economics, 
can we construct a value-relevant vision of political economy and social philosophy.  To 
put this another way, economics focuses on the play within any given set of rules; while 
social philosophy reflects on questions of justice and the “good society”.  Political 
economy insists that questions of justice and the “good society” cannot be addressed 
independently from the recognition that politics is never about particular distributions of 
resources, but always about rules of the social game that engender a pattern of exchange, 
production and distribution.  Questions of “fairness” and “justice” are not about 
distributional outcomes and end-states, but about rules and the process of social 
interaction within those rules.  Ultimately, social philosophers may be asking “what is a 
good game?”, but it is the science of economics that answers the question of “how 
players play the game given the rules of the game.”  Political economy as a discipline is 
about the tacking back and forth between the rules and the strategies, and the recognition 
that the answer to “what is the good game?” cannot be provided unless we examine how 
the players are going to play that game given those rules.  Economics provides necessary 
(not sufficient) information to social philosophy, without which social philosophic 
discourse will prove irrelevant for answering the questions asked concerning the “good 
society.”   
 Economics is a public science in two senses.  If the knowledge produced by the 
discipline results in better laws, rules and institutions, then the public appellation is 
justified.  But, Buchanan stresses, there is another sense in which economics is a public 
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science.  It is an educational endeavor where the transmission of the basic knowledge of 
the discipline improves the ability of the students to be informed participants in the 
ongoing democratic process of the selection of the parametric constraints within which 
economic interaction takes place. (see Buchanan 2000 [1996], p. 48) 
 In both senses of economics as public science, spontaneous order theorizing is not 
at odds with the intellectual exercise of constitutional craftsmanship.  In fact, rather than 
in contradiction, they exist in a symbiotic intellectual relationship to one another.  The 
spontaneous order of economic play within the market is structured by the framework of 
law and order established, and the framework of law and order that is self-sustaining is 
one that is legitimated in the history and culture of a people.  It does come, as Hamilton 
suggested, down to us to see our constitutions as a product of reflection and choice rather 
than accident and force.  But history and culture do in fact matter.  As Buchanan has 
recognized in a variety of different contexts, it is history and culture that represent the 
status quo from which all political negotiation must begin.  The “here and now” is what it 
is, no normative weight attributed to it, it just is.  But that means that all bargaining must 
begin there, and not at some mythical start state.   
 Constitutional craftsmanship begins with this recognition of the previous 
evolution, and proposes rules that hypothetically will enable us to live better together, 
subject to the agreement of parties to the collective action, and so established will realize 
the hypothesized Pareto improvements by creating an economic environment where the 
spontaneous ordering of the market realizes the gains from trade, and realizes the gains 
from innovation that follow from the promotion of social cooperation under the division 
of labor.  Not only is there freedom in constitutional contract, there is also the promise of 
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peace and prosperity.  That is an important lesson that economics has to offer to our 
fellow citizens as they engage in the ongoing practice of democratic self-governance.  
And, it is a lesson that is taught perhaps clearer than in any other writer in the history of 
our discipline by the work of James M. Buchanan. 
 29 
 
References 
Aligica, P. D., and Peter Boettke. 2009. Challenging Institutional Analysis and 
Development: The Bloomington School. New York: Routledge. 
 
Boettke, P. 2001 [1994]. “The Political Infrastructure in Economic Development,” in 
Calculation and Coordination. New York: Routledge. 
 
Boettke, P. 2009a. “Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment,” 
The Annual Proceedings of The Wealth and Well-Being of Nations (1): 41-51. 
 
Boettke, P. 2009b. “Review of Eric Jone’s Cultures Merging,” Economic Development 
and Culture Change, 57 (January): 434-437. 
 
Boettke, P. and Christopher Coyne. 2006. “The Role of the Economist in Economic 
Development,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 19 (2): 47-68. 
 
Boettke, P. and Christopher Coyne. 2009. “Best Case, Worse Case, and the Golden Mean 
in Political Economy,” Review of Austrian Economics, 22 (2): 123-125. 
 
Boettke, P., Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson. 2008. “Institutional Stickiness and the 
New Development Economics,” American Journal of Economics & Sociology, 67 
(2): 331-358. 
 
Boettke, P., Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson. 2006. “High Priests and Lowly 
Philosophers: The Battle for the Soul of Economics,” Case Western Reserve Law 
Review, 56 (3): 551-568. 
 
Boettke, P. and Steven Horwitz. 2005. “The Limits of Economic Expertise,” History of 
Political Economy, 37 (Annual Supplement): 10-39. 
 
Boettke, P. and Peter Leeson. 2004. “Liberalism, Socialism and Robust Political 
Economy,” Journal of Markets & Morality, 7 (1): 99-111. 
 
Brennan, G. and James M. Buchanan. 2000 [1985]. The Reason of Rules. Vol. 10 in The 
Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1954]. “Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets,” Vol. 1 in 
The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1959]. “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political 
Economy,” Vol. 1 in The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
 30 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1962]. “What Should Economists Do?,” Vol. 1 in The Collected 
Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1967]. “Politics and Science,” Vol. 1 in The Collected Works of 
James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1969]. Cost and Choice. Vol. 6 in The Collected Works of James 
M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2000 [1975]. The Limits of Liberty. Vol. 7 in The Collected Works of 
James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2001 [1977]. “Law and the Invisible Hand,” Vol. 17 in The Collected 
Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1979]. “Politics Without Romance,” Vol. 1 in The Collected 
Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty  Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1982]. “Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence,” Vol. 1 in 
The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2001 [1983]. “Political Economy: 1957-1982,” Vol. 19 in The Collected 
Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1999 [1986]. “Better than Plowing,” Vol. 1 in The Collected Works of 
James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2001 [1986a]. “The Potential for Tyranny in Politics as Science,” Vol. 
17 in The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2001 [1986b]. “Cultural Evolution and Institutional Reform,” Vol. 18 in 
The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2000 [1993]. “Asymmetrical Reciprocity in Market Exchange,” Vol. 12 
in The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 2000 [1996]. “Economics as a Public Science,” Vol. 12 in The Collected 
Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. and Gordon Tullock. 1999 [1962]. The Calculus of Consent. Vol. 3 in 
The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. and Viktor Vanberg. 2001 [1991]. “The Market As a Creative Process,” 
Vol. 18 in The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund. 
 31 
 
Caldwell, B. 2004. Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hamilton, A. 1787. The Federalist Papers #1, accessed online at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1948 [1944]. “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in Individualism and 
Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1948 [1946]. “Individualism: True and False,” in Individualism and 
Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1967. “The Results of Human Action But Not of Human Design,” in Studies 
in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1979. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Hume, D. 1985 [1758]. Essays Moral, Political, and Literary.  Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund. 
 
Jones, E. 2006. Cultures Merging. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Knight, F. 1951. “The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics,” American 
Economic Review, 42 (March): 1-29. 
 
Knight, F. 1960. Intelligence and Democratic Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Lerner, A. 1946. The Economics of Control. London: Macmillian. 
 
Medema, S. 2009. The Hesitant Hand. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mises, L. 1966 [1949]. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Chicago: Henry 
Regnery. 
 
Ostrom, V. 1973. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. Tuscaloosa, 
AL: University of Alabama Press. 
  
Rodrik, D. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and 
Economic Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Samuelson, P. 1948. Economics. New York: McGraw Hill. 
 32 
 
Simons, H. 1983. Simon’s Syllabus. Fairfax, VA: Center for Study of Public Choice. 
 
Smith, A.  1982 [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Smith, A. 1976 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wagner, R. 2004. “Public Choice as an Academic Enterprise,” American Journal of 
Economics & Sociology 63 (January): 55-74. 
 
Wagner, R. 2007. “Value and Exchange,” Review of Austrian Economics, 20 (2-3): 97-
103. 
 
Williamson, C. 2009. “Informal Institutions Rule,” Public Choice, 139 (3): 371-387. 
 
 
 
